Thus, despite the fact that coercive pressures “may increase as custody is prolonged,” Minnick, 498 U. S., at 153, the real problem in Roberson may have been that the police did not leave him sitting in jail for long enough. 585, 954 A. At that time, Shatzer was incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown, serving a sentence for an unrelated child-sexual-abuse offense. See infra Part V.C. Regardless of whether he cooperated with the second investigation, he was still being held for the first crime. Accordingly, a suspect’s statements are inadmissible if the police fail to inform that suspect of his or her Miranda rights. Douglas F. Gansler: Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court: This case is here from the Maryland Court of Appeals. [Footnote 4] However, as discussed above, the Court ignores the effects not of badgering but of reinterrogating a suspect who took the police at their word that he need not answer questions without an attorney present. The issue before the United States Supreme Court was the ... Maryland v. Shatzer A. b. LEO: Law … If they cease questioning and then reinterrogate the suspect 14 days later without providing him with a lawyer, the suspect is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that he really does not have any right to a lawyer. While that may relieve the accumulated coercive pressures of custody that are the foundation for Edwards, it is hard to see how it bolsters the suspect’s confidence that if he asks for counsel he will get one. 4–13. Shatzer was surprised because he thought that the investigation had been closed, but Hoover explained they had opened a new file. Id., at 474. The case, Maryland v. Shatzer, 08-680, examined whether a police investigation in Maryland was performed illegally when they re-interrogated a man suspected of sexual assault over two years after the first interrogation. Additionally, Shatzer argues that supplying the accused with counsel benefits the prosecution in that it is more difficult for a suspect to argue that a statement made in counsel’s presence is involuntary. Michigan v. Jackson. “Because of this special ability of the lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client becomes enmeshed in the adversary process, the Court found that the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 682, n. 4 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 2003, the Hagerstown Police Department (“Police Department”) began investigating … Outline abbreviations a. MRTC: Miranda right to counsel. That does not mean that the ability to consult freely with attorneys and others does not reduce the level of coercion at all, or that it is “only questionably relevant,” post, at 7, to whether termination of custody reduces the coercive pressure that is the basis for Edwards’ super-prophylactic rule. But my view is not that “confidence in the police’s promise to provide counsel” is “the touchtone.” Ante, at 17. The decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel. But certain things change over time. Ante, at 12. The Court’s arbitrary 14-day rule fails this test, even under the relatively permissive criteria set forth in our precedents. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7–8); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 349 (1990); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 644, n. 4 (1984). On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. But once the suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect, there will be nothing to gain by such gamesmanship—nothing, that is, except the entirely appropriate gain of being able to interrogate a suspect who has made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. Edwards’ fundamental purpose is to “[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through counsel,” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 291, by “prevent[ing] police from badgering [him] into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350. Shatzer in- It is easy to believe that a suspect’s later waiver was coerced or badgered when he has been held in uninterrupted Miranda custody since his first refusal to waive. An officer went to the prison to interview Shatzer about the allegation but he invoked his Miranda right to counsel. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324, 326 (1969) (holding that a suspect was in custody while being held in own home, despite his comfort and familiarity with the surroundings); Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1, 5 (1968) (holding that a person serving a prison sentence for one crime was in custody when he was interrogated in prison about another, unrelated crime); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 478 (1966) (“[W]hen an individual is … deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized”). Without minimizing the harsh realities of incarceration, we think lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda. As a factual matter, we do not know whether the defendant has been able to seek advice: First of all, suspects are told that if they cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for them. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. And when it is determined that the defendant pleading Edwards has been out of custody for two weeks before the contested interrogation, the court is spared the fact-intensive inquiry into whether he ever, anywhere, asserted his Miranda right to counsel. The Zerbst inquiry takes into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver—including any improper pressures by police. The Court never explains why its rule cannot depend on, in addition to a break in custody and passage of time, a concrete event or state of affairs, such as the police having honored their commitment to provide counsel. Second, because police know that their suspect is otherwise detained, there is no need necessarily to resolve the case quickly. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel. 289 (2010). It is unlikely to change the fact that a detainee “considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance.” Roberson, 486 U. S., at 683. Prison also presents a troubling set of incentives for police. The justification for Fifth Amendment rules “must be consistent with … practical realities,” Roberson, 486 U. S., at 688 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and the reality is that police may operate within the confines of the Fifth Amendment in order to extract as many confessions as possible, see Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 Minn. L. Rev. I join Part III of the Court’s opinion, which holds that release into the general prison population constitutes a break in custody. Brief Analysis: Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda … In this case, the Supreme Court will resolve this split and decide if a break in physical custody or a significant lapse of time terminates Edwards’ presumption of coercion. Furthermore, even if the Court were to draw a line, Shatzer argues that for some defendants, including Shatzer, obtaining advice to re-invoke their right to counsel after a specified period of time would be cost prohibitive. How then, under the Court’s decision today, will Edwards serve the role that the Court placed on it in Montejo? In 2003, a police detective tried to question respondent Shatzer, who was incarcerated at a Maryland prison pursuant to a prior conviction, about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. Id., at 473–474. Thus, the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), does not constitute Miranda custody. Maryland argues that a court should not presume that coercion exists when re-interrogation is so far removed in time from a suspect’s initial invocation of his or her right to counsel; instead, a court should assess each case separately to determine if the police overreached. See, e.g., Code of Md. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court will decide if a break in custody or a significant lapse of time terminates Edwards v. Arizona’s irrebuttable presumption that any statements made by a criminal defendant after invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel are the product of a coercive interrogation environment. 08–680. Reinterrogation in different custody or by a different interrogating agency would seem, if anything, less likely than termination of custody to reduce coercive pressures. We begin with the benefits. The court held that “the passage of time alone is insufficient to [end] the protections afforded by Edwards,” and that, assuming, arguendo, a break-in-custody exception to Edwards existed, Shatzer’s release back into the general prison population between interrogations did not constitute a break in custody. 1213 (2010) the Court addressed two Miranda issues— Miranda custody and reinterrogation of a person after that person has effectively invoked the Miranda right to counsel. Before the interview ended, Shatzer agreed to Hoover’s request that he submit to a polygraph examination. We conclude that such an extension of Edwards is not justified; we have opened its “protective umbrella,” Solem, 465 U. S., at 644, n. 4, far enough. … But in fact that rests upon the same basis as the concurrence’s own approval of a 212-year break in custody: how much time will justify “treating the second interrogation as no more coercive than the first,” post, at 10. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made inculpatory statements. 1996). In any case, a break-in-custody exception will dim only marginally, if at all, the bright-line nature of Edwards. But when a guard informs a suspect that he must go speak with police, it will “appear” to the prisoner that the guard and police are not independent. 2009). Cf. Shatzer. The resulting delay will only increase the compelling pressures on the suspect. The Fifth Amendment prohibits a state from compelling a criminal defendant “to be a witness against himself.” To ensure police compliance with this prohibition, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule under which the police must inform a suspect of certain rights that he or she may exercise, including the right to counsel. 2010 in Maryland v. Shatzer.vi The facts of Shatzer , taken from the case are as follows: In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Hagerstown Police Department referred to the department allegations that respondent Michael Shatzer, Sr., had sexually abused his 3-year-old son. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court’s decision, holding that the Circuit Court erred in failing to suppress Shatzer’s statements. Preserving a suspect’s right to choose to have counsel present during an interrogation serves both administrative and substantive purposes. This Article examines each opinion through a pragmatic lens, with an eye towards ascertaining whether the Roberts Court remains committed to the pragmatic approach taken by its predecessors. Maryland v. Shatzer – US Supreme Court – Case Review - Read the Criminal Law legal blogs that have been posted by Landon Joseph Ascheman on Lawyers.com see http://dpscs.md.gov/locations/mcih.shtml; http://www. It is not apparent to me that the presumption of involuntariness the Court recognized in Edwards is justifiable even in the custodial setting to which Edwards applies it. See Roberson, 486 U. S., at 681 (“[I]f a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ ”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96, 110, n. 2 (1975) (White, J., concurring in result) (“[T]he accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities’ insistence to make a statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism”). In 2003, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution, invoked his Miranda rights, refusing to speak about alleged sexual child abuse without an attorney present. After the 2003 interview, Shatzer was released back into the general prison population where he was serving an unrelated sentence. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Shatzer, holding that the Circuit Court for Washington County erred by admitting Shatzer’s statements. It agrees that Edwards prophylaxis is not perpetual; it agrees that a break in custody reduces the inherently compelling pressure upon which Edwards was based; it agrees that Shatzer’s release back into the general prison population constituted a break in custody; and it agrees that in this case the break was long enough to render Edwards inapplicable. In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Hagerstown Police Department referred to the department allegations that respondent Michael Shatzer, Sr., had sexually abused his 3-year-old son. The relevant point here is more limited: A long break in time, far longer than 14 days, diminishes, rather than eliminates, that compulsion. in basic adult education and occupational training, id., Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their accusers. at 1219–20. Or only one week? At the time of this allegation, Shatzer was imprisoned for a different child-sexual-abuse conviction. Today’s decision, moreover, offers no reason for its 14-day time period. A judicially crafted rule is “justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose,” Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 458 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), and applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs, Montejo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14). The source of the holdings in the long line of cases that includes both Edwards and Miranda, however, is the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination applied to the “compulsion inherent in custodial” interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 458 (1966), and the “significan[ce]” of “the assertion of the right to counsel,” Edwards, 451 U. S., at 485. The rationale of Edwards is that once a suspect indicates that “he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel,” “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 681 (1988). In most cases that determination will be easy. certiorari to the court of appeals of maryland. He is in custody. When the detectives then questioned Shatzer, he became upset, started to cry, and incriminated himself by saying, “ ‘I didn’t force him. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction does not create the coercive pressures produced by investigative custody that justify Edwards. 378 (1981).”) WILDER V. STATE, ___ Md. certiorari to the court of appeals of maryland, No. 486 U. S., at 678. But things have now changed. When Blankenship explained that he was there to question Shatzer about sexually abusing his son, Shatzer expressed confusion—he had thought Blankenship was an attorney there to discuss the prior crime for which he was incarcerated. It is important to distinguish this from the point that I make above about indigent suspects. and . 5. The 2003 allegation was assigned to Detective Shane Blankenship, who went to interview Shatzer in prison. It seems to us that period is 14 days. Counsel can curb an officer’s overbearing conduct, advise a suspect of his rights, and ensure that there is an accurate record of any interrogation. The facts of the case, drawn from the Court’s syllabus, are as follows: Fields, a Michigan [jail inmate, who was serving a sentence as opposed to awaiting trial], was escorted … Below Argument Opinion Vote Author Term; 08-680: Court of Appeals of Maryland : Feb 24, 2010: 9-0: Scalia: OT 2009: Holding: When the police arrest a suspect, they must tell him his Miranda rights, which include the right to a lawyer and the right to remain silent. See Perkins, 496 U. S., at 299. Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation would not significantly increase the number of genuinely coerced confessions excluded. Id., at 467. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created a second layer of protection to prevent law enforcement from badgering a suspect into waiving his or her right to counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On June 16, 2006, the police charged Shatzer with a number of offenses, including sexual child abuse. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made certain admissions. According to Maryland, if a significant break in time occurs, such as the more than two and a half year break in this case, Edwards’ presumption is inapplicable, because such a lapse does not remotely resemble the “‘persistent attempts by officials to persuade [a suspect] to waive his [or her] rights’ that the Edwards rule is designed to protect.”. Op. To be sure, we have said that “[t]he merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.” Minnick, 498 U. S., at 151. The answer, we are told, is that once a suspect has been out of Miranda custody for 14 days, “[h]e has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends.” Ante, at 8. 2d 985, 989 (D. C. 1991); cf. (b) Shatzer’s release back into the general prison population constitutes a break in Miranda custody. They live among other inmates, guards, and workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone. A prisoner’s freedom is severely limited, and his entire life remains subject to government control. The Court responds that “[i]f confidence in the police’s promise to provide counsel were the touchstone, Edwards would not have applied in Minnick, where the suspect in continuing custody actually met with appointed counsel.” Ante, at 17–18. In 2003, a police detective tried to question respondent Shatzer, who was incarcerated at a Maryland prison pursuant to a prior conviction, about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. Justice Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in judgment. 4. tracked the ethical rules by way of . Shatzer was released back into the general prison … Additionally, Maryland argues that the fact that Shatzer was released back into a confined situation, prison, is irrelevant, because an incarcerated individual grows accustomed to the prison system’s restraints and is no longer affected by them. Shatzer contends that recognizing a break in custody as a termination of Edwards’ presumption would effectively nullify the presumption for most defendants, because most cases involve multiple interrogations and a break in custody. Const., Amdt. Shatzer helps us distinguish and interpret two prior cases: Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477. Rather, my view is that although an appropriate break in custody will mitigate many of the reasons that custodial reinterrogation of a suspect who requested counsel is inherently compelling, it will not mitigate the effect of an indigent detainee believing that he has “been denied the counsel he has clearly requested,” Roberson, 486 U. S., at 686. And it not only prevents questioning ex ante; it would render invalid ex post, confessions invited and obtained from suspects who (unbeknownst to the interrogators) have acquired Edwards immunity previously in connection with any offense in any jurisdiction. [Footnote 15] But, when a suspect has been left alone for a significant period of time, he is not as likely to draw such conclusions when the police interrogate him again. [Footnote 2]. Instead, the Court simply decides to create a time-based rule, and in so doing, disregards much of the analysis upon which Edwards and subsequent decisions were based. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350 (1990) (subsequent confession suggests the police “badger[ed] a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights”). Thus, “once the accused has requested counsel,” courts must be especially wary of “coercive form[s] of custodial interrogation.” Bradshaw, 462 U. S., at 1051 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Failure to say where the line falls short of 212 years, and leaving that for future case-by-case determination, is certainly less helpful, but not at all less arbitrary. Content Partner: Quinlan Publishing: Price: $135.00* This program is no longer available. 2d, at 1131. App. The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 6 (1964), provides that “[n]o person . The former interrogator has no power to increase the duration of incarceration, which was determined at sentencing. Petitioner, the State of Maryland (“Maryland”), argues that the presumption of coercion should not apply when its application does not further Edwards’ goal of preventing police from badgering a suspect until he or she confesses. 2 M ir and v .A zo, 38 4U S … Shatzer appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals. The Court explicitly recognized/created a break in custody exception to the Edwards rule. The Shatzer case addressed the issue of when a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel may be re-interrogated. In the case before us, however, the suspect was returned to the general prison population for 2 years. The Edwards presumption of involuntariness is justified only in circumstances where the coercive pressures have increased so much that suspects’ waivers of Miranda rights are likely to be involuntary most of the time. Edwards held: “[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. The defendant asserted his right to counsel … See Roberson, 486 U. S., at 686. Additionally, the United States distinguishes this case from prior case law, which suggests that, once triggered, the Edwards presumptions lasts indefinitely, on the basis that all such cases involved suspects, who were in continuous police custody until re-approached.The United States points out that, if a suspect still feels that he or she cannot participate in an interrogation without the assistance, he or she may simply re-invoke her right to counsel.Finally, the United States argues that, for purposes of Miranda, a person serving a prison sentence is not in custody unless he or she is subject to additional restraints that surpass those of normal incarceration.
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